APPENDIX A: APPENDIX FIGURES AND TABLES FIGURE A.1.-Investor 2's take-up rates. Note: This figure presents the mean (and 95% confidence interval) of the take-up rate for each group of investor 2's. Investors in conditions A to C have peers who wanted the asset. These investors were randomly allocated to one of these three groups. Those in condition A had no information about their peers. Those in condition B had information that their peers wanted to purchase the asset but had that choice rejected by the lottery. Those in condition C had information that their peers wanted and received the asset. Investors in condition A neg have peers who did not want to purchase the asset (and received no information about their peer).
(a) Amount invested (b) Invested more than the minimum FIGURE A.2.-Investor 2's alternative outcomes. Note: Panel (a) presents the mean (and 95% confidence interval) of amount invested for each group of investor 2's. Panel (b) presents the mean (and 95% confidence interval) of a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor invested more than the minimum amount for each group of investor 2's. Investors in conditions A to C have peers who wanted the asset. These investors were randomly allocated to one of these three groups. Those in condition A had no information about their peers. Those in condition B had information that their peers wanted to purchase the asset but had that choice rejected by the lottery. Those in condition C had information that their peers wanted and received the asset. Investors in condition A neg have peers who did not want to purchase the asset (and received no information about their peer).
(a) Investor 2 is financially sophisticated (b) Associated investor 1 is financially sophisticated FIGURE A.3.-Heterogeneity of social learning effects-self-assessed measure of financial literacy. Note: Panel (a) presents the mean (and 95% confidence intervals) of take-up rates for investor 2's in conditions A and B, separately for those who are and who are not financially sophisticated. Panel (b) presents the take-up rates separately for those whose associated investor 1's are and who are not financially sophisticated. Investors in conditions A and B have peers who wanted the asset. Those in condition A had no information about their peers. Those in condition B had information that their peers wanted to purchase the asset but had that choice rejected by the lottery. The financial sophistication variable is based on a self-assessment question conducted in a follow-up survey, where investors were asked to rank their level of financial sophistication from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high). Investors who reported 4 or higher were classified as financially sophisticated. a Column 1 presents the characteristics of the experimental sample, combining investor 1's and investor 2's. Column 2 presents the sample characteristics of investor 1's in the experimental sample, while columns 3 and 4 present the information for investor 1's who wanted and who did not want the asset, respectively. Column 5 presents the characteristics of investors 2's in the experimental sample, while columns 6 and 7 present the information for investor 2's whose peers wanted and did not want the asset, respectively. Column 8 presents the characteristics of the universe of investors in the main office of the brokerage. Each line presents averages of the corresponding variable. For earnings, we present the median value instead of the mean due to large outliers. The sample size for the earnings variable is smaller due to missing values. The omitted value for "Relationship with associated investor" is "friends." This variable is not defined for investors outside the experiment's sample. a Columns 1 and 2 present the averages of the corresponding variable, respectively, for investors assigned to be in the role of investor 1 and for those assigned to be in the role of investor 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Relationship with peer is not considered in this comparison since this variable is equal for both groups by construction. Column 3 presents the p-value of an F -test that the mean of the corresponding variable is the same for these two groups. Column 5 presents the averages for investor 1's who wanted the asset and won the lottery, while column 6 presents the averages for investor 1's who wanted the asset but did not win the lottery. Column 7 presents the p-value of an F -test that the mean of the corresponding variable is the same for these two groups. For earnings, we present the median and the p-value of a test that the median of this variable is the same for the corresponding groups. The sample size for the earnings variable is smaller due to missing values. Table II using Probit models instead of ordinary least squares regressions. The coefficients presented are average marginal effects. Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the pair level in column 4. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%. Table II using Logit models instead of ordinary least squares regressions. The coefficients presented are average marginal effects. Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the pair level in column 4. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%. a This table presents results using a GMM model, where the overidentifying restriction is that investor 1's take-up rate is a weighted average of investor 2's in conditions A and A neg . More specifically, the moment conditions are:
Panel A presents the treatment effects, while Panel B presents the GMM coefficients. We also present the p-value of Hansen's J overidentifying test. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%. This table presents the results of two-sided permutation tests with 10,000 replications for the main results in the paper. For each pairwise comparison, we randomly reassign the experimental treatment conditions, drawing treatment assignments (without replacement) in the same ratios as the actual experimental treatment assignments. Based on these "placebo" treatment assignments, we calculate "placebo treatment effects" using 10,000 independent reassignments. The distribution of "placebo treatment effects" from the 10,000 reassignments approximates the distribution of our estimator under the null hypothesis that the treatment effects are zero. We calculate p-values from the permutation tests as the proportion of "placebo treatment effects" that are greater (in absolute value) than the estimated treatment effects using the actual experimental treatment assignments. Panel A reports p-values from permutation tests for pairwise comparisons of the conditions of interest using three different outcome variables: take-up rates, amount invested, and a dummy variable indicating whether the investor invested more than the minimum amount. Panel B reports p-values from permutation tests for the heterogeneity results using the self-assessed measure of financial literacy. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%. Table II using the amount invested in the asset instead of take-up rate as dependent variable. Columns 3 and 4 replicate the regressions in columns 1 and 4 of Table II using a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor invested more than the minimum amount as dependent variable. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%. Table III using a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor invested more than the minimum amount instead of take-up rate as dependent variable. The financial sophistication variable is based on the self-assessment question conducted in the follow-up survey described in the text. Investors rated their financial knowledge from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high). Investors who reported 4 or higher were classified as financially sophisticated. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%. a This table presents coefficients on the interactions of the variables at the column heading with the treatment effects of interest. These results are based on the regressions used in the full specification of column 4 from Table II , including interactions of the group dummies (I c i , where c ∈ {condition B condition C condition A neg investor 1}) with the corresponding variables. We also include the main effect of the corresponding variable. In column 1, we interact the treatment effects with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the investors 1 and 2 are family members. The omitted category is "friends." In column 2, we interact the treatment effects with a variable indicating the number of calls that the broker had made before the day of the call. * significant at 10%; * * significant at 5%; * * * significant at 1%.
APPENDIX B: A SIMPLE MODEL OF FINANCIAL DECISIONS UNDER SOCIAL INFLUENCE
Our model studies an investment decision made by an individual under several conditions. First, we present the investment decision under uncertainty, but with no social influence. Second, we present the investment decision with social learning present, using the ingredients of a canonical social learning model: a peer makes an investment acting on a private signal, and this action can be used by another investor to make an informational inference before taking his own action. Third, we allow the ownership of an asset to affect a socially related investor's utility of owning the asset, aside from any learningthat is, we allow for a social utility effect. A peer's purchase decision typically will produce both social learning and social utility effects; we consider a case in which both effects are active (the full "peer effect") and a case in which the revealed preference purchase decision is decoupled from possession. This decoupling allows one to observe each channel through which peer effects work, and motivates our experimental design.
Investment Without Peer Effects
Consider an investor i's decision to invest in a risky asset. 22 The asset's return is given by x, with probability density function f (x), and investor i's utility is u i (x) = u(x) for all i. In our field experiment, investors received calls from brokers who offered them a financial asset for purchase. The brokers attempted to convey the same information about the asset in every call using a prespecified script; thus, the information they provided can be thought of as a signal, s i , coming from a single distribution, with probability density function g(s i ). Importantly, not every investor would have received exactly the same information: calls evolve in different ways, investors ask different questions about the asset, etc., meaning that each investor received a different signal realization, s i , from the common distribution of signals.
For expositional simplicity, assume that the conditional density f (x|s i ) satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) such that, intuitively, higher values of s i are indicative of higher values of x. Under these conditions, investor i is willing to invest if and only if
whereū denotes the outside option of the investor. Given that f (x|s i ) satisfies MLRP and given mild monotonicity assumptions on the utility function u(·) of the investor, there exists a unique thresholds 1 such that, for any s i ≥s 1 , investor i is willing to invest. Denote the decision to buy the asset made by investor i by b i = {0 1}. Hence, for an investor making a purchase decision in isolation, we have
Investment With Social Learning Alone
Suppose that instead of making his investment choice in isolation, before making his own decision, investor i observes the investment decision of investor j, which is given by b j . Assume that investor j made his choice b j = 1 in isolation and hence his decision rule is given by (3). 23 Thus, when investor i observes b j = 1, he correctly infers that s j ≥s 1 and he is willing to invest if and only if u(x)f (x|s i ; s j ≥s 1 ) dx ≥ū (4) Furthermore, given that f (x|s i ; s j ) satisfies MLRP, we have
for all s i . It is straightforward to show by comparing (4) and (2) that the signal realization threshold for investor i that is necessary to induce purchase of the asset is lower when b j = 1 is observed than when investor i makes his choice in isolation. This is because in the former case, regardless of his own private information summarized by s i , investor i has additional favorable information about the asset from observing the purchase of investor j. This is the pure social learning effect.
Denote the threshold for s i when investor i observes b j = 1 bys 2 and note thats 2 ≤s 1 . In particular, after observing a purchase decision made by investor j, the decision rule of investor i is given by
Social Utility and Social Learning
We now consider the situation in which both social utility and social learning effects are present. Our focus (following much of the literature on peer effects in financial decisions) is on social utility effects that result in a positive effect of a peer's possession of an asset (denoted by p j = {0 1}) on one's own utility.
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In particular, when investor i considers purchasing the asset, we assume that u(x|p j = 1) ≥ u(x|p j = 0) for all x. That is, investor i's utility is higher for all asset return realizations if the asset is also possessed by an investor j who is a peer of investor i. Using the notation of our model, an investor j's purchase of an asset, b j = 1, typically implies both that investor i infers favorable information about the asset, s j ≥s 1 , and that investor j now possesses the asset, p j = 1, which might affect investor i's utility of owning the asset (due to a taste for joint consumption, "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" preferences).
When investor i observes that investor j expressed an intention to invest, b j = 1, and was allowed to invest, p j = 1, both investor i's utility u(x|p j = 1) and his information about the asset f (x|s i ; s j ≥s 1 ) are affected, relative to his choice in isolation (i.e., relative to u(x) = u(x|p j = 0) and f (x|s i )).
25 In this case, one observes the "full" peer effect, and investor i invests if and only if u(x|p j = 1)f (x|s i ; s j ≥s 1 ) dx ≥ū (7) Denote the threshold for s i above which investor i is willing to invest when exposed to both peer effects channels bys 3 . Then, the decision rule for investor i is given by
To separate the effects of social learning and social utility, we need to decouple willingness to purchase (and the informative signal of the purchase decision) from possession. Consider the situation where investor i observes that investor j expressed a revealed preference to invest, but was not allowed to do so (perhaps due to capacity constraints). In this case, investor i infers that s j ≥s 1 , but also knows that investor j did not obtain the asset, so p j = 0. This condition is equivalent to the "social learning alone" problem discussed above: there is no direct effect of possession on investor i's utility from the asset, but there is social learning. Thus, investor i purchases the asset if and only if (4) is satisfied (since u(x) = u(x|p j = 0)) and this leads to the same decision rule as (6) with the thresholds 2 .
The following proposition summarizes investor i's purchase decisions across conditions. PROPOSITION 1: The threshold for the signal s i above which investor i is willing to purchase the asset (and, the likelihood of a purchase of the asset by investor i) is highest (lowest) when the investor makes his decision in isolation, lower (higher) when he observes that investor j intended to purchase the asset but did not obtain it, and lowest (highest) when investor j intended to purchase the asset, and obtained it:s 1 ≥s 2 ≥s 3 (and Pr(s i ≥s 3 ) ≥ Pr(s i ≥s 2 ) ≥ Pr(s i ≥s 1 )).
PROOF: The relationship betweens 1 ands 2 follows immediately from comparing the inequalities (2) and (4) and the monotone likelihood ratio property of f (x|s i ; s j ). Similarly, comparison of the inequalities (4) and (7) and u(x) = u(x|p j = 0) ≤ u(x|p j = 1) establishes thats 2 ≥s 3 . Finally, Pr(s i ≥s 3 ) ≥ Pr(s i ≥s 2 ) ≥ Pr(s i ≥s 1 ) follows from the ranking of the thresholds.
Q.E.D.
The difference betweens 2 ands 3 is the result of a difference in investor j's possession of the asset. 26 In one situation, investor j received favorable information and expressed an intent to purchase the asset, but was unable to execute the purchase due to supply restrictions. In the other situation, investor j received a favorable signal and was also able to obtain the asset. Thus, in the two cases, investor i infers the same information (via investor j's choice) about the potential returns of asset x. However, only in the latter case is investor i's utility directly influenced by the investment outcome (and not just the purchase intention) of investor j. This is the social utility effect that raises the expected utility of purchasing the asset for investor i over and above the social learning effect. In the inequalities in Proposition 1, the effect of social learning is captured by the difference between Pr(s i ≥s 2 ) and Pr(s i ≥s 1 ), and the effect of social utility is the difference between Pr(s i ≥s 3 ) and Pr(s i ≥s 2 ). The total peer effect is the difference between Pr(s i ≥s 3 ) and Pr(s i ≥s 1 ).
Our analysis readily extends to the case in which investor i's investment choice is continuous rather than limited to a binary decision. In particular, since f (x|s i ; s j ) satisfies MLRP, the optimal investment in the asset is increasing in s i and s j and the expected equilibrium investment amounts will follow exactly the prediction regarding purchase rates in Proposition 1. Suppose individual i chooses an investment magnitude q * i , rather than making a binary investment decision. Since f (x|s i ; s j ) satisfies MLRP, the optimal investment in the asset is increasing in s i and s j and we can rank the expected equilibrium investment amounts.
PROPOSITION 2: The expected equilibrium investment amount q * i of investor i is lowest when the investor makes his decision in isolation, higher when he observes that investor j intended to purchase the asset but did not obtain it, and highest when investor j intended to purchase, and obtained, the asset.
PROOF: The inference problem of investor i is the same as in Proposition 1. Thus, for a given signal s i , the described relationship holds for the actual equilibrium investment amount and follows immediately from comparing the expression for the utilities on the left-hand side of the inequalities (2), (4), and (7) and by noting that the optimal investment amount is increasing in s i and s j . Finally, taking expectations over the signal realizations s i yields the ranking in expected investment amounts.
Heterogeneous Investors
In practice, some investors are more financially sophisticated than others, and one would expect that this variation will affect the peer effects we study here-especially the impact of social learning. In particular, an unsophisticated investor may have much more to learn about an asset from the purchase decision of his peer than does a sophisticated investor, as the sophisticated investor likely has a very good sense of the asset's quality from his signal alone. Differing financial sophistication can be captured in our model by allowing the signals s i and s j to be drawn from distributions with differing precision. For simplicity, we make the assumption that, in contrast to unsophisticated investors, sophisticated investors receive perfectly informative signals. This assumption generates the following prediction of heterogeneous effects of social learning.
PROPOSITION 3: The thresholdss 1 ands 2 for the signal s i above which investor i is willing to purchase the asset (and hence the likelihood of investor i purchasing the asset) are identical if investor i is financially sophisticated (i.e., signal s i is perfectly informative). If investor j is sophisticated, then investor i follows the choice of investor j when observing the decision of investor j. PROOF: If s i is perfectly informative (i.e., investor i is sophisticated), then s i is a sufficient statistic for x. As a result, s j , and hence the purchase decision of investor j, has no informational value for sophisticated investor i and does not influence the thresholds 1 . Hence,s 1 =s 2 . If s j is perfectly informative, then investor j knows the value of x and makes a perfectly informed investment decision. As a result, investor i follows investor j's choice.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 suggests that social learning will be limited (in fact, given the simplifying assumptions made, will be nonexistent) for sophisticated investors. These investors are sufficiently well-informed that they are not influenced by the revealed preference of another investor. The proposition further shows that social learning will have relatively strong effects on investment choices if the investor whose choice is observed is sophisticated.
APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENTAL DOCUMENTATION
We enclose here English versions of the Qualtrics scripts used by the brokers in the sales phone calls, first to investor 1's and then to investor 2's. Then we enclose English versions of the follow-up survey questionnaires. After these documents, we enclose a picture of the implementation of the experiment, displaying the brokers and the RA. still imperfectly informative, signals. While results for general distributions of x, s i , and s j that satisfy MLRP do not exist, it is straightforward to show that, for binary signal structures, the impact of social learning will be relatively small when the observing investor is sophisticated and relatively large when the observed investor is sophisticated. Finally, it is worth noting that another investor's possession of the asset could still affect financially sophisticated investors' choices; similarly a financially unsophisticated investor's purchase decision-when accompanied by possession-could influence a peer's choice. Both of these effects would work through the social utility channel. Thus, we emphasize that these predictions of heterogeneous treatment effects apply to social learning effects alone, but not necessarily the overall peer effect.
Questions Regarding the Sales Call
(1) For investor 2's in conditions 1, 2, and 3 When the asset was offered to you in the beginning of the year, we had to use a lottery given that the asset was in limited supply. At that moment, you decided to purchase (not purchase) the asset. Was the presence of the lottery a significant factor in your decision?
a 
